Bundled coverage of different losses and distinct perils, along with differential deductibles and policy limits, are common features of insurance contracts. We show that, through these practices, insurers can implement multidimensional screening of insurance applicants who possess hidden knowledge of their risks and, as a consequence, reduce the externality cost of adverse selection. Competitive forces drive insurers to exploit multidimensional screening, enhancing the efficiency of insurance contracting. We also find that multidimensional screening allows competitive insurance markets to attain pure strategy Nash equilibria over a wider range of applicant pools, circumventing the nonexistence problem identified by Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976) .
I. Introduction
When insurance applicants possess hidden knowledge of their risks of incurring a loss, as in the seminal model of insurance contracting with adverse selection analyzed by Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976) , the market is driven by competition for those in the low risk class. These applicants wish to distinguish themselves from high-risk applicants in order to obtain insurance coverage at terms more favorable than would be made available if they were pooled with the high risks. The desired separation is attained through a screening mechanism whereby insurers offer applicants their choice from a menu of contracts, one of which provides high risks with full and fair insurance, while the other incorporates a lower average price for coverage but also includes a deductible that is unacceptable to high risks.
In this paper we show that separation of this sort is accomplished most effectively by multidimensional screening implemented through the contractual bundling of different perils and different losses. Bundled coverage, with differential deductibles and policy limits, allows insurers to screen applicants in several dimensions thereby reducing the externality cost that low risk applicants must bear to distinguish themselves from high risks. As a consequence, insurers can compete most effectively for the low risk applicants by offering contracts that exploit efficient multidimensional screening.
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The prediction that insurance markets will offer contracts with differential coverage for alternative losses and distinct perils is confirmed by commonly observed practices. For example, a typical homeowner's policy provides bundled indemnification for both liability and property losses, with different policy limits for these losses.
Further, within each category of loss, a homeowner faces different levels of coverage for distinct perils that cause the same damage, or different losses caused by the same peril.
Generally, there is a deductible for the home being destroyed by fire, but if the same home is destroyed by flood the deductible is 100%, as the policy explicitly provides no coverage for this peril. Moreover, losses of specific types of property, such as jewelry, rugs or antiques, are also subject to specific (lower) sublimits.
Similarly, automobile insurance typically bundles different levels of coverage, such as losses resulting from collision, personal injury, uninsured motorists, and medical bills, into the same policy with different sublimits depending on the peril or category of loss. It is also common to observe different deductibles for alternative perils causing the same loss. For example, an automobile lost through theft or fire is typically subject to a lower deductible through the "comprehensive" portion of the policy than would be the case were the loss a result of an accident and therefore covered by the "collision" part of the policy. Coverage limitations are also commonly observed in commercial insurance, where sublimits, coinsurance provisions, deductibles and exclusions often vary according to the peril or type of loss.
2 Our analysis not only shows that multidimensional screening is efficient, but also shows that multidimensional screening provides an avenue for insurance markets to circumvent the nonexistence problem identified by Rothschild and Stiglitz. They established that a pure strategy Nash equilibrium fails to exist if the proportion of high risks in the applicant pool is sufficiently low. 3 We demonstrate that, by reducing the externality cost of adverse selection, efficient multidimensional screening allows competitive insurance markets to attain pure strategy Nash equilibria over a wider range of applicant pools. 4 Indeed, by increasing the dimensionality of the screening space, insurers reduce the cost of the adverse selection externality. We conclude that market forces compel each insurer to offer contracts with differential coverage for alternative losses and distinct perils that implement multidimensional screening, thereby enhancing both the efficiency of insurance contracting and the prospects for existence of Nash equilibrium.
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The paper proceeds as follows. In the next section, we describe the RothschildStiglitz insurance market, the externality cost of adverse selection, and the potential nonexistence problem. In Section three, multidimensional screening is introduced through differential levels of insurance coverage, and necessary and sufficient conditions are identified under which multidimensional screening is efficient. In section four we
show that efficient multidimensional screening in the insurance market enhances the prospects for existence of a pure strategy Nash equilibrium. The final section contains concluding remarks.
II. Efficiency and Nash Equilibrium in the One-Dimensional Screening Model
In the one-dimensional screening model of insurance contracting with adverse selection developed by Rothschild and Stiglitz, competing insurers face two large classes of insurance applicants presenting independent risks. Applicants are expected utility maximizers, each endowed with an exogenous wealth W, a risk averse von NeumannMorgenstern utility function , and the possibility of incurring a loss with damage D.
They differ only with respect to the probability of incurring the loss, and each applicant belongs to one of two risk classes with greater than .
Although insurers know these probabilities and the proportion of the applicant pool belonging to the high risk class, they do not know the risk class to which a particular applicant belongs.
An insurance contract consists of a premium and a deductible S that together determine wealth levels if the damage is incurred and otherwise. Since the amount of loss D is fixed, a deductible is simply a policy indemnification that is less than the amount of loss, and this coverage limitation could instead be implemented through policy limits or coinsurance provisions.
Therefore, we shall use the term "deductible" to refer to any type of coverage restriction.
The expected utility of a contract C to an insurance applicant of risk type t is defined by .
The expected profit earned by an insurer selling contract C to an applicant of risk type t is defined by .
Insurers are assumed to be risk neutral, and to incur no costs other than indemnified claims.
As a consequence of the informational asymmetry, the only feasible contracts are those that satisfy the incentive compatibility constraints
An interim incentive efficient contract solves the problem of maximizing the expected utility of L-types, , subject to the incentive compatibility constraints (3), the resource constraint for the economy ,
and a voluntary participation constraint for H-types, ,
that specifies an arbitrary lower bound for their expected utilities. The class of interim incentive efficient contracts is generated by varying the participation constraint utility level.
A solution to an interim efficiency problem, which is formally characterized by Snow (1985, 1986) , can be described with reference to Figure 1 . At a solution, the resource constraint (5) holds with equality, as does the incentive constraint (3) for H-type applicants. The contingent wealth position for the H-types entails full insurance, and so lies along the 45º line. The corresponding contingent wealth for Ltypes provides less than full insurance, and is located on the (dotted) locus FA in Figure   1 . One member of the class of interim efficient contracts is depicted in Figure 1 by the wealth allocations {M, Y}, which is a solution to the efficiency problem when the participation constraint utility for H-types is set at or below the level associated with the indifference curve labeled . Higher levels of reservation utility for the H-types result in efficient wealth allocation pairs closer to point F, which corresponds to the firstbest pooling contract and is itself a solution to the efficiency problem when is set equal to , where .
The case depicted in Figure 1 illustrates the nonexistence problem identified by Rothschild and Stiglitz, which there are no jointly profitable and incentive compatible defections that can attract both types of applicants away from their Rothschild-Stiglitz contracts, which as a result are sustainable as a pure strategy Nash equilibrium. Put differently, the pure strategy Nash equilibrium exists when the Rothschild-Stiglitz contracts are interim incentive efficient.
Finally, the critical value, , is the value of at which the Rothschild-Stiglitz contracts are the interim efficient contracts most preferred by the L-types, that is, they solve the interim efficiency problem when the participation constraint (6) is omitted.
This relationship will be exploited in section four to demonstrate that multidimensional screening reduces and thus broadens the range of markets in which pure strategy Nash equilibria exist.
III. Efficient Multidimensional Screening
We introduce multidimensional screening in the insurance market setting by assuming that D is the expected damage conditional on a loss occurring, and that the potential causes of this expected damage can be partitioned into mutually exclusive and collectively exhaustive perils. 8 We use to denote the loss associated with the ith peril and to denote the conditional probability of this loss occurring for an applicant in risk class . Insurers categorize applicants on the basis of observable traits, and we assume that in partitioning the perils space insurers know the damage and conditional probability for each peril. The probability of a loss occurring, , remains hidden knowledge, along with the conditional probabilities , but insurers can now exploit n signaling dimensions to screen insurance applicants.
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In this context, a contract consists of a premium and a vector of deductibles that together determine wealth if damage is incurred as a consequence of the ith peril, and if no damage is incurred. The expected utility of a contract C to an insurance applicant of risk type t is now given by ,
and the corresponding expected profit by .
Hence, just as in the model of one-dimensional screening, there are only two types of insurance applicants and they signal their types through their deductible choices. Our innovation is to allow applicants to signal their hidden knowledge of risk type in more than one dimension through the choice of a vector of deductibles.
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It is important to recognize that bundling of coverage for all of the perils into a single insurance policy is efficient. With bundling, there are only two incentive compatibility constraints (3), one for each risk class. However, if the perils were unbundled and covered by separate contracts, then additional incentive compatibility constraints would be required. Since these additional constraints cannot increase the value of efficient contracts, bundling of the perils is efficient. 11 Moreover, as in the onedimensional screening environment, only the H-type incentive constraint is binding at a solution to an interim efficiency problem, and a solution provides H-types with full coverage and underinsures L-types. Thus, the introduction of multidimensional screening through a partitioning of the perils potentially responsible for damage does not fundamentally alter the structure of the screening environment set out by Rothschild and Stiglitz.
As in the case of one-dimensional screening where there is a single deductible, interim incentive efficient contracts maximize the expected utility of L-types subject to the incentive compatibility constraints (3), the resource constraint (5), and the voluntary participation constraint for H-types (6), but now using definitions (7) and (8) for expected utility and profit in place of (1) and (2). The Lagrangian expression associated with the interim efficiency problem may be written as (9) The first-order conditions characterizing the L-type contract are (10) for the no-loss state, and for all screening dimensions i 12 (11) while those for the corresponding H-type contract are ,
and for all screening dimensions i
Equations (12) and (13) In what follows, we shall say that multidimensional screening is efficient if, at a solution to the interim efficiency problem, for some dimensions i and j, so that L-types bear a deductible that differs according to the peril. Notice that efficient multidimensional screening always follows the pattern of comparative advantage enjoyed by L-types for signaling in one dimension rather than another. Moreover, this pattern depends solely on the exogenous conditional probabilities associated with the perils.
This result is analogous to that obtained by Rothschild (2007) and Finkelstein, Poterba and Rothschild (2007) in an annuity setting, where the "low risk" annuitants (those with lower survival probabilities) distinguish themselves by their willingness to accept lower annuity payments in future years. Those that are "high risk" (with higher survival probabilities), however, find such front loading to be more costly since they have a better chance of living long enough to suffer the effects of the lower annuity payments. Put differently, the low risks signal their types by accepting lower annuity payments in states that they do not expect to experience.
Finally, suppose that a finer partitioning of the ith signaling dimension can divide the conditional probability between two perils, one with conditional probability and the other with probability . While H-types are unaffected by the introduction of multidimensional screening, since their efficient contract entails full and fair insurance, L-types benefit in three ways.
First, the bundling of separate perils is valuable to the L-types since bundling reduces the number of incentive constraints that must be satisfied, as compared to the unbundled alternative. Second, they obtain relatively more coverage for the perils they are more likely to experience, and third, this shift in coverage makes their contract less attractive to H-types, relaxing the incentive constraint and thus further reducing the cost of adverse selection to the benefit of L-types. Hence, adopting efficient multidimensional screening is Pareto improving and each insurer, competing for L-types, will be led by market forces to implement efficient multidimensional screening. We shall henceforth assume that multidimensional screening is efficient.
V. Pure Strategy Nash Equilibrium with Multidimensional Screening
In this section we establish that efficient multidimensional screening improves the prospects for existence of a pure strategy Nash equilibrium by reducing the critical value of below which Nash equilibrium does not exist. It is important to recognize that this result is not a trivial consequence of the assumed efficiency of multidimensional screening since, as an implication of Theorem 1, all of the second-best incentive efficient contracts are more valuable to L-types with multidimensional screening. 13 Thus, L-types are better off with multidimensional screening than they are with one-dimensional screening not only at the candidate for Nash equilibrium, but also at any potential defection. The intuition behind our existence result is that incentive feasible contracts farther removed from the first-best pool, F, entail higher adverse selection costs for Ltypes, who then gain more from the introduction of multidimensional screening. With reference to Figure 1 , L-types gain more from the introduction of efficient multidimensional screening at point A than at point Y, diminishing the attractiveness of their defecting contract.
Recall that, in the case of one-dimensional screening, there exists a critical value, , at and above which the Rothschild-Stiglitz contracts are interim incentive efficient.
A parallel result holds in an environment with multidimensional screening. The analogue to the Rothschild-Stiglitz contracts in such an environment provides the H-types with full and fair insurance, and hence provides them the sure wealth that results in point in Figure 1, 
equation (16) 
for the no-loss state, and for all screening dimensions i .
The first-order conditions for the corresponding incentive efficiency problem, whose
Lagrangian is given by equation (9) (19) and (20) for when equation (20) (19) and (20) for program (B), we arrive at for .
By equating (21) and (22) and rearranging terms we obtain for . As the right-hand side therefore has the same value for and , we have
Without loss of generality we may assume , which by Theorem 1 implies and then, since the less-than-full-insurance assumption implies that is greater than , the left-hand side of (23) 
and for each screening dimension .
From the corresponding first-order conditions for program (B) we obtain (26) and for each screening dimension .
The supposition that , and the continuity of the problem, implies the existence of values for and such that the right-hand sides of (24) and (26) are equal and the right-hand sides of (25) and (27) 
Since the solution to program (B) entails , the additional constraint is binding at a solution to the amended program and, therefore, the solution is the same as the solution to program (A). The first-order condition for the jth screening dimension in the
where is the Lagrange multiplier for the additional constraint. [Notice that the firstorder condition for the kth screening dimension is ,
and that (29) and (30) From equation (29) we obtain ,
and from the first-order condition for the jth screening dimension in the original program
Since and , the left-hand side of (32) As a result of Lemmas 4 and 5, inequality (18) must hold, so that , where the equalities follow from Lemma 2. Thus, from equation (16) we obtain the following result.
Theorem 2. If n-dimensional screening is efficient and it is efficient to further partition one of the screening dimensions into two distinct perils, then .
This Theorem shows that the implementation of efficient multidimensional screening in any dimension reduces the critical value and improves the prospects for the existence of Nash equilibrium. As a consequence, implementation of efficient multidimensional screening increases the scope for Nash equilibrium to characterize the outcome of competitive contracting in insurance markets with adverse selection.
To pursue the implications of Theorem 1 further, suppose that the partitioning of the nth signaling dimension increases the value of the incentive efficiency problem. increase the value of the incentive efficiency problem. In that case, the limit value of the smallest conditional probability ratio is zero, and the first-order condition for efficient signaling in that dimension implies that the limit value for is zero. Then, since is positive, the first-order condition must hold, implying that the limit value for is zero. Hence, with continued finer partitioning of the perils space, efficient screening approaches first-best. We also conclude that, for any value of , efficient multidimensional screening leads to if the screening space can be sufficiently finely partitioned, eliminating the nonexistence problem identified by Rothschild and Stiglitz.
VI. Conclusions
Bundled coverage of different losses and distinct perils with differential deductibles and policy limits allows insurers to implement multidimensional screening of insurance applicants who possess hidden knowledge of their risks of loss. As in the case of one-dimensional screening examined by Rothschild and Stiglitz, competition for low risk applicants governs the level of signaling and the existence of Nash equilibrium, but is now also seen to determine the number of distinct screening dimensions exploited in insurance contracting. When the two types of applicants face different odds of incurring losses of distinct types or a loss caused by distinct perils, multidimensional screening reduces the externality cost of adverse selection that low-risk applicants must bear to distinguish themselves from high risks, as the two types can be more efficiently sorted by offering different coverage limitations for the alternative loses in a pattern advantageous to the low risks. Moreover, by reducing the externality cost of adverse selection, efficient multidimensional screening allows competitive insurance markets to attain pure strategy Nash equilibria over a wider range of applicant pools.
These insights apply equally in other markets where adverse selection limits contracting possibilities. In the job market context examined by Spence (1973) , where education serves as the signaling dimension, fields of specialization play the role of distinct perils, as those job applicants best suited for positions as engineers have an advantage in math and the natural sciences, while those best suited for positions as journalists find a more writing-intensive curriculum to their advantage. Similarly, in credit markets applicants can signal their creditworthiness by accepting a higher collateral requirement, as suggested by Bester (1985) . By setting different requirements for different types of collateral, lenders can take advantage of any differences in the willingness of applicants to bear the risk of forfeiture, enhancing efficiency and the prospects for existence of a pure strategy Nash equilibrium in these markets.
Endnotes
1 It is worth noting that some authors have examined repeated contracting in adverse selection economies, which also introduces a kind of multidimensional screening wherein signaling dimensions correspond to distinct time periods, and experience rating is possible. Multidimensional screening is efficient in these contexts when principals and agents can commit to long-term contracts. Cooper and Hayes (1987) and Dionne and Doherty (1994) pursue analyses in this vein. Fluet (1992) considers a temporal version of partitioning perils, establishing that a time-dependent deductible is efficient when two risk types differ regarding the likely time of incurring the insured loss. Most notable in this regard, however, is the recent work on adverse selection in annuity markets by Rothschild (2007) , and Finkelstein, Poterba and Rothschild (2007) . In their setting, the informational asymmetry pertains to the conditional survival probabilities of the agents, and the "low" risk (from the perspective of the seller of the annuities) agents are those with the lower probability of surviving to the next period. They show that low risk agents distinguish themselves by exhibiting a willingness to accept front-loaded payment profiles, in essence accepting lower payments in states that they are less likely to experience. Similarly, in our model, low risk agents distinguish themselves by accepting larger deductibles for perils that they have lower probability of suffering. None of these other studies, however, consider the implications of multidimensional screening for the existence of pure strategy Nash equilibrium. 3 This finding of market failure has spawned a substantial literature aimed at resolving the existence question, including the non-Nash equilibrium concepts developed by Wilson (1977) and Riley (1979) , and the Nash refinements in alternative three-stage games considered by Cho and Kreps (1987) and Hellwig (1987) . Although each of these approaches admits a pure strategy equilibrium, their predictions regarding the equilibrium do not agree. Puelz and Snow (1994) provide a summary of the contractual allocations supported by these alternative theories. In a related vein, Rosenthal and Weiss (1984) exhibit a mixed strategy Nash equilibrium that always exists given a fixed number of insurers. However, as they acknowledge, if existing firms are playing their equilibrium mixed strategies, then an entrant can play a different mixed strategy and earn positive profit. Hence, their solution to the existence problem does not apply in the environment studied by Rothschild and Stiglitz who assume (p. 631) that "[t]he market is competitive in that there is free entry."
4 As a result of the potential nonexistence of a pure strategy Nash equilibrium, and of the multiplicity of alternative candidates for equilibrium, positive (equilibrium) analysis of insurance markets with private information has been problematic. For example, Hoy (1982) examines the effect of categorical discrimination on market equilibrium, and finds that the results are ambiguous and depend on the precise nature of the equilibrium being considered. In contrast, Crocker and Snow (1986) adopt a normative (efficiency) approach to the problem, and conclude that to permit such categorization results in potential Pareto improvements relative to the no-categorization alternative. More recently, Finkelstein et al. (2007) examine the effect of banning gender-based discrimination in annuities. Again, the problematic nature of equilibrium in these settings necessitated that they adopt a normative, rather than positive, analytical approach. Since we demonstrate in this paper that competitive pressures force individual insurers to exploit multidimensional screening, and that this practice broadens the range of markets attaining a pure strategy Nash equilibrium, the scope for positive analysis of insurance market reforms is correspondingly broadened.
5 Only one study of multidimensional screening has considered the implications for existence of Nash equilibrium. Bond and Crocker (1991) introduce a second signaling dimension by assuming correlation between risk type and the intensity of preference for a hazardous good whose consumption can be monitored by the insurer. Their approach fundamentally alters the insurance contracting environment by introducing a moral hazard component through the hidden effects of the hazardous good on the probability of incurring the loss. In contrast, multidimensional screening is introduced in our model through optimal partitioning of the signaling space without otherwise altering the adverse selection environment. 6 Rothschild and Stiglitz restrict insurers to each offer only a single contract, and their counterexample demonstrating that a pure strategy Nash equilibrium may not exist concentrates on the existence of a profitable pooling contract preferred by both types of customers to . While the existence of such a pooling contract is sufficient to demonstrate non-existence, it is not necessary, as recognized by Rothschild and Stiglitz (p. 643) . Indeed, this is the case in Figure 1 , where there are no profitable pooling defections of the type considered by Rothschild and Stiglitz (since the pooling fair-odds line FE lies everywhere below the indifference curve ), yet the pair is preferred by both types to . The most attractive defections always involve separating pairs, such as in which there is a cross-subsidy from L-types to the Htypes. This issue is addressed in Crocker and Snow (1985) .
where . This derivative is negative since we have and when L-types are under insured, implying that T is positive.
externality is eliminated by a multidimensional screening contract in which the L-type deductible is positive only in the kth dimension. 13 Increased efficiency does not necessarily improve the prospects for existence of Nash equilibrium, as demonstrated by Hoy (1982) , and Crocker and Snow (1986) . The latter show that risk categorization by immutable observable traits is efficient when the proportion of H-types varies across the categories, so that categorization is informative. However, the implications for existence are ambiguous. The prospects for existence of Nash equilibrium are enhanced for the category in which H-types predominate, but are worsened for the category in which L-types are more prevalent. 
